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COMMENTARY-REGULATORS OF THE PROFESSION
III. STATE SUPREME COURT REGULATORY AUTHoluTY OVER THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
The primary regulatory authority of the states over the legal pro-
fession is historically grounded and institutionally secure. There have
been and will continue to be conflicts with the federal government
over certain aspects of that regulatory authority. This is an inevitable
aspect of our federal system. After all, inasmuch as there are conflicts
between state and federal authority in the regulation of business, the
environment, welfare and education, to say nothing of tax policy, how
could we expect there would not be parallel conflicts concerning reg-
ulation of the legal profession?
The constitutional foundation of state authority over the legal
profession is a simple result of our nation's history. The states pre-
existed the union formed by the Constitution in 1787. The states all
had courts and they all had legal professions, even if the bar at that
early time was embryonic compared with its modern configuration.
The early federal government had problems enough establishing its
authority in foreign affairs and policy toward the western territories
and in the relationship between the federal judiciary and the state
court systems. Regulation of the legal profession, such as it was, re-
mained with the states as a matter of tradition and by default. It re-
mains there.
The states regulated the profession very loosely until well into the
twentieth century. Discipline was handled by rather casually organ-
ized grievance committees, using procedures whose informality is
shocking according to modern standards.' The courts were actively
involved only in lawyer appeals from disciplinary dispositions and in
occasional judicial pronouncements on such issues as the duties of
loyalty and confidentiality.2 The legal profession itself had no gener-
ally accepted standards of conduct until 1908 with the adoption by the
American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics. Even then,
* Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Director, American Law
Institute. BA. Swarthmore College 1953; LL.B. Columbia Law School 1954.
1 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Cameron Beard, A Lauyer's Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Professional Disciplinary Proceedings, 96 YALE LJ. 1060 (1987).
2 Legal treatises on the law governing lawyers began appearing around the turn
of the century. See, e.g., EDWARD M. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON Arromvs AT LAW
(1914).
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the Canons were admonitory and had very ambiguous status as au-
thoritative pronouncements.3
The regulation of the legal profession by anything like a system-
atic body of law was forthcoming only after 1970. That year saw the
promulgation by the ABA of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code). The Code as such had no binding legal effect. Rather, it was
adoption of the Code by the highest courts of the states that gave the
Code legal effect. The same was true of the ABA's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, a revision of the Code promulgated by the ABA in 1983
and similarly adopted, although only in part in several states.4 It was
also in 1970 that systematic efforts were undertaken to strengthen the
disciplinary machinery, under the impetus of the "Clark Report."5
In short, systematic regulation of the legal profession by the states
is a phenomenon of the last two or three decades.
In the meantime the federal government made various intru-
sions. Some of these quite modest intrusions were undertaken by ad-
ministrative agencies, for example, the Treasury Department and the
Securities and Exchange Commission requirements that lawyers prac-
ticing before those agencies establish registration with them. Much
more intrusive were decisions by the Supreme Court imposing limita-
tions on state regulation under the aegis of the Due Process, Equal
Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses and the First
Amendment. 6 The liberation of lawyer advertising, for example, is a
consequence of Supreme Court decisions and so is the atrophy of resi-
dence requirements for practice of law. More recently, a potentially
much more penetrating intrusion has been made under color of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as demonstrated in another paper in
this symposium.
Still more recently has been the controversy with the Department
of Justice about Rule 4.2, the "anti-contact" provision in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. That controversy became heated virtually
at its outset by reason of the ill-considered "Thornburg Memoran-
dum," in which the Department foolishly (and in my view errone-
ously) asserted the lawyers employed by the federal government were
3 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 55 (1986).
4 Id. at 56-63.
5 ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and
Recommendations (1970), conventionally referred to the as the Clark Report after
the chair of the Committee, retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark.
6 See Roberti. Martineau, The Supreme Court and State Regulation of the Legal Profes-
sion, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199 (1981); Paul G. Gill, Invalidation of Residency Require-
ments for Admission to the Bar, 23 U. RiCH. L. REV. 231 (1989); see also Barnard v.
Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989).
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wholly exempt from the governance of state ethical codes.7 Fortu-
nately, more sober counsel has prevailed. Negotiations, so far appar-
ently productive, have been conducted that can lead to a satisfactory
resolution of that controversy.
A less visible but more persistent challenge to the authority of
state supreme courts in regulation of the bar comes from the bar it-
self. Put simply, there are and continue to be problems in conduct of
lawyers where the outlook and orientation of the bar is different from
that of the courts. These differences are reflected in provisions en-
acted into or proposed for the ethical codes.
The Code and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted
and have the force of law by action of the highest courts of the states.
However, the texts of these rules were formulated by a process under
the direction of lawyers, with only marginal and incidental participa-
tion by judges. In my opinion the resulting formulations have been
generally responsible and expressive of proper concern for the gen-
eral public interest. (My viewpoint is no doubt affected by the fact
that I was a participant in the rule-drafting endeavors.) Nevertheless,
there are and continue to be problems in the conduct of lawyers
where the position that the bar is willing to take is, in my opinion,
different from that which the courts ought to take.8
I mention only three of these. One is the problem of candor to
the court, specifically where a litigation lawyer encounters the fact
that his client has committed perjury. Here, the courts hold that a
lawyer has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension, even
though that requires blowing the whistle on the client.9 Understanda-
bly, the lawyers shrink from such a duty. A second is the problem of
refraining from assisting a client in fraud, specifically where a transac-
tion lawyer discovers that the transaction the lawyer is documenting is
tainted with fraud. Here, the law in effect requires the lawyer to blow
the whistle on the client (the phrase in this context is "make a noisy
withdrawal"), on pain of exposure to liability as an accomplice in the
fraud. Here too, and also understandably, the lawyers shrink from the
obligation to turn on their clients.10
7 See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors:
The Controversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 291 (1992).
8 See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389
(1992).
9 See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); Committee on Professional Eth-
ics and Conduct v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976).
10 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm, 33 EMOm, LJ. 271 (1984); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client
Fraud: They Still Don't Get It 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 701 (1993).
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Another area concerns obtaining information from a criminal de-
fense lawyer about the client. Here the bar wants to hold that a lawyer
should never have to provide any information that would tend to in-
criminate the client. A subsidiary proposition is that prosecutors
should not be permitted to interrogate a criminal defense lawyer, or
subpoena the lawyer's records, except in limited circumstances and
then only with prior judicial approval. Some courts have been amena-
ble to the bar's position on these issues, in my opinion being inade-
quately attentive to the competing needs of law enforcement. 1 In any
event, the matter is one on which there is disagreement between many
segments of the bar and many courts.
It would appear that the primacy of the states in regulation of the
bar is not in serious jeopardy as against the federal government. I
certainly hope so. I also hope, however, that the state courts are atten-
tive to efforts by their own bar associations to promote the bar's con-
ception of the lawyer's proper role in relation to client conduct, in
displacement of what many of us think is a better conception of that
role.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987); Fred C.
Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Juy Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76 MINN.
L. REv. 917 (1992).
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